Testimony Before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, June 4, 2013

[On June 4, 2013, I was called as a witness to testify before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. Below is the entirety of my prepared statement – I believe, there were some off the cuff remarks that probably drove the French language interpreters nuts.]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me today to speak. As I wear several hats when it comes to North Korea, whether it is HanVoice, www.cankor.ca, or the North Korean Human Rights Film Festival Toronto, on behalf of all these organizations, I again extend my thanks.

Canada’s DPRK Policy: Controlled Engagement

Canada’s response to North Korea has been, at least rhetorically, aggressive. Since 2010 our government has pursued what has been termed a “Controlled Engagement” policy. The Controlled Engagement (“CE”) policy restricted bilateral contact with the regime except to four distinct areas: regional security concerns, human rights and the humanitarian situation, inter-Korean relations, and consular issues. It also forbid Canadians from importing and exporting anything into North Korea, and also introduced strict technology and investment sanctions.

UN Security Council Identifies Additional Companies Subject to Sanctions

[On 16 April 2012, the United Nations Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement to condemn North Korea’s failed missile launch. This directed the DPRK Sanctions Committee (“1718 Committee”) to impose new sanctions and tighten enforcement of existing sanctions on the DPRK. On Monday, 2 May 2012, the Committee identified three new North Korean companies for sanctions, updated information on the Committee’s lists of prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile technology, and clarified the Committee’s annual work plan. The following is the text of Security Council document SC/10633. –CanKor]

Security Council Committee Determines Entities, Goods Subject to Measures Imposed on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by Resolution 1718 (2006)

On 16 April 2012, by its presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/13), the Security Council agreed to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009). The Security Council further directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to undertake these tasks and to report to the Security Council within 15 days.

On 2 May 2012, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) designated the following three entities to be subject to the provisions of and the measures imposed in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006):

1. AMROGGANG DEVELOPMENT BANKING CORPORATION

• Description: Amroggang, which was established in 2006, is a Tanchon Commercial Bank-related company managed by Tanchon officials. Tanchon plays a role in financing KOMID’s sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Tanchon Commercial Bank was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
• Location: Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, DPRK
• A.K.A.: AMROGGANGDEVELOPMENT BANK; AMNOKKANG DEVELOPMENT BANK

2. GREEN PINE ASSOCIATED CORPORATION

• Description: Green Pine Associated Corporation (“Green Pine”) has taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
  Green Pine is also responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK.
  Green Pine has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related material from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms.
• Location: c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea; Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK
• A.K.A.: CHO’NGSONG UNITED TRADING COMPANY; CHONGSONG YONHAP; CH’O’NGSONG YO’NHAP; CHOSUN CHAWO’N KAEBAL T’UJA HOESA; JINDALLAE; KU’MHAERYONG COMPANY LTD; NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION; SAEINGP’IL COMPANY

3. KOREA HEUNGJIN TRADING COMPANY

• Description: The Korea Heungjin Trading Company is used by KOMID for trading purposes. We suspect it has been involved in supplying missile-related goods to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Heungjin has been associated with KOMID, and, more specifically, KOMID’s procurement office. Heungjin has been used to procure an advanced digital controller with applications in missile design. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
• Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
• A.K.A.: HUNJIN TRADING CO., KOREA HENJIN TRADING CO., KOREA HENGJIN TRADING COMPANY

The Committee also determined that the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic missile programmes in document S/2012/235 shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 8(a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).

Furthermore, the Committee determined that the items contained in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part1 shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 8(a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).

On the same date, the Committee also adopted its programme of work.

The lists of entities, goods and individuals are available on the Committee’s website, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml.

Related articles

• Statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council (CanKor.ca)

Why the “Satellite” Launch Will Be Successful – and Why That Should Worry Us

Well, that was fast.

Barely two weeks after what seemed to be a good first step in the right direction, the North Koreans announced that they would test-fire a satellite launching rocket sometime in mid-April.

Having taken a course called “Outer Space and Security” in grad school many moons ago (where my final term paper was coincidentally on the North Korean ballistic missile program), I happen to know a little bit about the vagaries of ballistic missile technology. As reported en masse over the weekend, ballistic missiles/space rockets happen to fall in the same “dual use” quandary as nuclear energy. Namely, that the same technologies that can help a country send a satellite into space can also help a country strike another country, such as the United States, thousands of miles away.

So really, what are the North Koreans thinking?

Let them eat sanctions, by Erich Weingartner

Photo by Erich Weingartner

On 15 August—the day that both Koreas celebrate their liberation from Japanese colonial rule—the Canadian Government enacted new sanctions against the DPRK. According to John Baird, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, these are additional punishments “in a series of steps our government has taken in recent years to forcefully declare Canada’s opposition to aggressive actions by the current North Korean regime.”

The new round of sanctions bans all exports and imports, including technical data, to North Korea, as well as all new investment in the country. It also bars the provision of financial services to North Korea and to persons in North Korea, although personal remittances of less than $1,000 continue to be permitted. Presumably this is to allow North Korean refugees and defectors to support families back home.

“This is a regime that shows contempt for international will through its belligerent actions,” adds Minister Baird, “and that chooses to fund military and nuclear programs while the basic needs of the North Korean population go unmet.”

CanKor Brain Trust member appointed to UN experts panel

CanKor extends heartfelt congratulations to Brain Trust member and former UK ambassador to the DPRK John Everard for his appointment to the Panel of Experts created by the UN Security Council in UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (after the DPRK’s May 2009 nuclear test).  The Panel assists the UN Committee established after the first nuclear test (the “1718 Committee”) in carrying out its mandate; gathers, examines and analyses information relevant to implementing the measures agreed by the Security Council; and recommends actions to improve their implementation.  He will be based in New York but will travel extensively because the Panel frequently inspects shipments of banned goods that have been intercepted by member states.

The endurance of Korea’s endless stand-off

The imminent collapse of the DPRK regime has been predicted numerous times in the past 60 years, and repeatedly after the death of “great leader” Kim Il Sung in 1994. As far back as 1990, Nicholas Eberstadt wrote an op-ed entitled “The Coming Collapse of North Korea”, followed by a 1999 book entitled “The End of North Korea”, and an essay in December 2004 where he explains why his predictions had not yet come true. See “The Persistence of North Korea”.

Following Kim Jong Il’s stroke in the summer of 2008, the failures of various economic schemes, the UNSC-authorized sanctions and most recently the Cheonan incident, the question surrounding the imminent collapse of the North Korean regime hangs in the air again. Charles J. Hanley of the Associated Press gathers the opinions of a number of experts as to the endurance of Korea’s endless standoff. Read his article here.