Secret US-DPRK Talks? Chris Nelson Deciphers Recent White House Comments

[A number of statements by US Administration officials in recent weeks have some experts wondering whether there are secret US-DPRK talks happening through back channels and what might be the contents of such talks. In the 24 May 2012 edition of the Nelson Report, Chris Nelson ponders the significance of comments by Ben Rhodes, US deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, as reported by Yonhap news agency. We reprint the Yonhap story below, followed by Chris Nelson's commentary, with kind permission of the author. --CanKor]

WHAT’S UP WITH THE US AND DPRK? (by Chris Nelson)

That other major “war and peace” problem, N. Korea, also may be the subject of renewed discussions, at least… it seems very premature to talk about “negotiations”. We confirmed in Tuesday’s Report S. Korean and VOA accounts of a “secret” Administration mission to Pyongyang at the end of April, just prior to the failed ICBM/satellite launch.

(For current coverage in the ROK, see “U.S. Officials in Secret Visit to N. Korea Before Rocket Launch” in the English version of Chosun Ilbo.)

Yesterday, an official White House briefing, and then in Tokyo, State Dept. Special Envoy Glyn Davies, who was not on the mission, can be argued to have indirectly confirmed both the trip, and the purpose we had speculated in last night’s Report… that is, interest on both sides in trying to walk the situation back to the 2/29 agreement, including US food aid as a buy-in for resurrecting the agreement to freeze nuclear weapons and missile tests.

North Korea as a Nuclear Power and the Prospects of Its Control, by Hans-Joachim Schmidt

[This is a paper for German readers of CanKor. The author, Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, is Senior Research Fellow at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK) – also known in English as Peace Research Institute Frankfurt/M (PRIF) – and an expert on the Six-Party Talks. Dr. Schmidt is a good friend of CanKor and has previously submitted his work for our benefit. We thank the author for making the full German version of this paper available to CanKor. A brief summary of his latest paper follows here in both English and German. For the full version of the German paper, please follow this link: Nordkorea als Nuklearmacht - Chancen der Kontrolle, or by clicking on the image of the title page below. – CanKor]

North Korea as a Nuclear Power and the Prospects of Its Control

In the latest HSFK-Report, Hans-Joachim Schmidt evaluates the prospects of both cooperative and confrontational approaches against the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

Since its first nuclear test in 2006, a nuclear North Korea cannot be prevented anymore. Therefore, one major aim of international politics must be to delay, constrain and control the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

In HSFK-Report 1/2012, Nordkorea als Nuklearmacht – Chancen der Kontrolle (North Korea as a Nuclear Power and the Prospects of Its Control), Hans-Joachim Schmidt presents the multifaceted regional and global threats of both conventional and nuclear armament of North Korea and analyzes how the North Korean leadership can be urged to follow its international commitments.

He examines problems and prospects of cooperative and confrontational approaches by South Korea, the US, Japan, China and Russia who seek a political arrangement with North Korea regarding nuclear technology. Against the background of their different interests, the author develops specific propositions for a relaunch of the six-party talks following the presidential elections in the USA and South Korea.

A Monk’s Earthly Mission: Easing North Koreans’ Pain, by Choe Sang-Hun

[I have known the Ven. Pomnyun for more than a dozen years. We meet infrequently on my trips to Seoul. He is one of the rare people who has made the transition from human rights struggles in South Korea to human rights struggles for the North Korean people. He is also one of the rare examples of a human rights-minded activist who sees human rights as much more than civil and political rights. For Pomnyun and the "Good Friends" organization that he founded, the current price of rice in North Korea's markets is as important as the current number of prisoners in North Korea's labour camps. Economic, social and cultural rights occupy a large part of his agenda, which also means that Pomnyun has tirelessly promoted humanitarian assistance to North Korea, despite concerns about monitoring its distribution. Although the information collected by his organization is not always the most reliable, it does provide informal and localized indicators of change, for example in the food supply of villages and counties outside urban areas. We were pleased to see this article about Pomnyun, authored by Choe Sang-Hun, in the New York Times on 27 April 2012, and offer it here for our readers. --EW, CanKor]

South Korean Buddhist monk Venerable Pomnyun in his office at Peace Foundation in Seoul. (Photo by Woohae Cho, The International Herald Tribune)

In August 1996, the Venerable Pomnyun, a Buddhist monk from South Korea, was cruising down the Yalu River between China and North Korea when he saw a boy squatting alone at the North Korean edge of the water. The boy was in rags, his gaunt face covered in dirt.

Pomnyun shouted to him, but the boy did not respond. Pomnyun’s Chinese companion explained that North Korean children were instructed never to beg from foreigners. And when Pomnyun asked if the boat could be steered closer to the child to bring help, he was reminded that they could not enter North Korean territory.

“Never before had I realized the meaning of a border so painfully until that day,” said Pomnyun, 59. “Never before had I felt so acutely that Korea is a divided nation.”

North Korea’s Treacherous New Course, by Leon V. Sigal

[The following commentary by Leon Sigal, long-time friend of CanKor, appeared in the American bimonthly foreign-policy journal The National Interest, 19 April 2012. Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York and author of Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. --CanKor]

“There they go again.” That was the Washington’s reaction to North Korea’s recent rocket launch and renunciation of its February 29 commitment not to conduct a nuclear test. Yet this time looks different—and more dangerous. These actions suggest Pyongyang no longer cares about improving relations with the United States, the premise of its willingness to restrain its nuclear and missile efforts.

Unbounded nuclear and missile development by Pyongyang would gradually erode the security of all of its neighbors and the world at large. The only prudent course is a robust strategy of containment: denial of its weapons-related trade by tougher inspections of suspect cargo and tighter overflight restrictions.

A Mixed History

For years, North Korean officials have been saying they want to improve relations with the United States and were prepared to restrain their nuclear and missile programs in return. An end to enmity—what the North called U.S. “hostile policy”—would improve North Korean security and provide a counterweight to China. It would also facilitate aid and investment from South Korea and Japan, thereby reducing its economic dependence on China.

Given the lack of trust between the two countries, however, Pyongyang insisted on reciprocal steps by Washington—action for action—to build confidence. Pyongyang’s decision to conduct last week’s test launch, by contrast, destroyed confidence.

The Paint Dries By James Church

[From time to time CanKor alerts readers to papers published by our partner-site 38North. The following article is by James Church, the nom de plume of the "Inspector O" novels and a former intelligence officer with plenty of DPRK experience. Please follow our link to the current article on the 38North site. --CanKor]

There is a regular posse of US policymakers and pundits who, when it comes to dealing with North Korea, like to say that Washington should not “buy the same horse twice.” Sooner or later, when something goes wrong—and it usually does—they end up galloping off on their own steeds—the Three Horses of the Apocalypse: Hysteria, Hyperbole, and Hyperventilation. However, in what seems to be a short reprieve, this may be a good moment to take a deep analytical breath before things start going to hell again, which they inevitably will, and take a look around.

As a general rule, following an unremarkable leadership transition is pretty much the same as watching paint dry on a summer afternoon. So far, to the chagrin and surprise of a number of observers who apparently expected a different outcome, the paint on the North Korean succession looks fine. Last week, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) held another party conference, and with it, the new regime under Kim Jong Un (now KWP First Secretary and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission) has been fleshed out. As of April 15, we have what looks to be the new leadership ranking order. Alas, nothing on the personnel front really catches the eye. The trends set in place (and the decisions foreordained) by Kim Jong Il remain on track. The most one can say is that the KWP leadership structure, after a hiatus of nearly 18 years, appears to be back at full complement.

Statement by the (North) Korean Committee for Space Technology

[Following the unsuccessful launch of a DPRK satellite into orbit on Friday, 13 April 2012, and a UN Security Council President's statement on 16 April 2012 condemning the launch and pledging to add  “additional entities and items” to the existing sanctions, the DPRK Foreign Ministry pledged to launch more satellites, and declared that it would no longer be bound by the 29 February agreement with the USA. Numerous North Korean organizations have since made their own statements, in each case adding copious insults against outgoing ROK President Lee Myung Bak. Considering that this was the first time that the DPRK admitted that its satellite launch had failed, we found the following statement by the Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) particularly worthy of note. The statement is taken from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) website. --CanKor]

DPRK’s Satellites for Peaceful Purposes to Continue Orbiting Space: KCST Spokesman

Pyongyang, April 19 (KCNA) — A spokesman for the Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) Thursday released the following statement:

Unha-3 rocket at launch (photo source unknown)

Since the KCST’s announcement of the planned launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong-3 on March 16, the issue of the DPRK’s satellite launch has become topic of debate in the world. Those who sympathize with truth and love justice were unanimous in praising the plan with much expectation. But, the unjust and ill-tempered hostile forces have worked hard to mislead public opinion with groundless assertions and sophism.

The U.S. and Japanese reactionaries and their special class stooge Lee Myung Bak are taking the lead in the smear campaign. It is their brigandish assertion and their lackey’s nonsensical talk that the DPRK should not be allowed to launch a satellite for peaceful purposes. They claim that as Kwangmyongsong-3 was launched by Unha carrier rocket, it was not a satellite but a long-range missile and it, therefore, seriously threatened the U.S. mainland and Japanese archipelago and made south Korea unstable. Finally, they made a far-fetched assertion that the DPRK’s launch of the above-said satellite was “a violation” of the UNSC resolution and a grave “violation” of the DPRK-U.S. agreement and a military “provocation” to them.

North Korea in April: Defining the Future Under Kim Jong Un by Ruediger Frank

[From time to time CanKor alerts readers to papers published by our partner-site 38North. The following article is authored by CanKor Brain Trust member Ruediger Frank. Find more articles by Ruediger Frank here. Please follow our link to the current article on the 38North site. --CanKor]

April 2012 promises to be an interesting month for North Korea and its observers, with at least four mega-events. The long announced celebrations to mark the 100th birthday of the country’s late founder Kim Il Sung will be held on the April 15. Two days before, the annual session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (the North Korean parliament) will convene. The fourth Conference of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) will take place on the 11th. Last, but not least, around the same time a rocket launch that has been criticized by the West as a missile test is set to take place.

April 15, 1912 was not only the day the Titanic sank. In a small village near Pyongyang, a boy with the name Kim Song Ju was born. Later, much like Lenin (Uljanow) and Stalin (Tschugaschwili), he adapted an alias. In October 1945, by then called Kim Il Sung, the 33 year old youngster was presented to the wondering population by the Soviets as the liberator of the country from the Japanese. Hardly anybody took the young man seriously back then, neither his Soviet protectors nor his much more numerous, senior, powerful and experienced domestic political competitors. They were wrong, as they later learned the hard way. By building and breaking alliances, first the Christians and then rival factions within the Korean Communist camp were eliminated or assimilated, until Kim Il Sung and his Kapsan guerilla faction had acquired a monopoly of power within the KWP.

Kim Il Sung smartly used the badly failed Korean War (1950-53) not only as a welcome occasion to eliminate some of his influential political foes. He also converted Korea into one of the hot spots of the Cold War and was thus able to force the Soviet Union and China to provide much more economic, military and political aid than either of them had originally intended. The costs for Mao Zedong included his eldest son Anying, still buried in North Korea. Even my home country East Germany, laying in ruins after World War II and the post-1945 demounting policy of the Soviets, and facing fierce competition from West Germany which prospered under the Marshall Plan, felt compelled to rebuild North Korea’s second largest city, Hamhung, at an enormous cost.

The DPRK Rocket and Korean Peace by Georgy Toloraya

[From time to time CanKor alerts readers to papers published by our partner-site 38North. The following article is authored by Russian North Korea expert Georgy Toloraya. Please follow our link to the current article on the 38North site. --CanKor]

Why would North Korea sacrifice its long-cherished dream of improving relations with the United States for such a trivial thing as “fireworks” for a national holiday? Around the world, people are wracking their brains trying to explain this seemingly sudden “satellite launch” decision, and the theories that have emerged so far can be grouped as follows:

1. The DPRK had a calculated plan: first, reach an agreement that is attractive to the United States; then do something highly provocative to raise the stakes and create crisis; and finally, after the dust settles, negotiate from a position of strength to get more. In the process, North Korea also planned to confirm its status as a nuclear power and undermine the position of South Korean conservatives.[1]
2. The decision to launch a rocket is the result of a rift between “soft-liners” and “hard-liners” in Pyongyang, in the absence of strong leadership (as President Obama said, “we don’t know who’s calling the shots”). The North Korean negotiators did not know about the launch plan and did not discuss this issue with their American interlocutors when working out the “Leap Day” agreement.
3. There are even more exotic theories that imply it was a US plot to reach an agreement that demonstrated its desire for peace, while fully understanding that a satellite launch, about the right to which North Koreans have warned, would break the deal. As a result, there would be no need to fulfill controversial US obligations (like discussing the provision of an LWR and the lifting of sanctions), and they would gain new leverage to pressure an inexperienced North Korean leader to the brink of surrender. Paradoxically, the events unfolding so far fall well into such a scenario.

I believe, however, as often happens when real-world politics are analyzed by theoreticians, that the extent to which multistage planning was involved has been exaggerated, and that the influence of chaotic factors has been largely underestimated. In all likelihood, this is probably a case of diplomatic mishap, where both sides—both well intentioned to achieve meaningful results and promptly report them—due to internal policy considerations (the election campaign in United States and the official announcement of Kim Jong Un’s status on Kim Il Sung’s centenary birthday), pushed their luck too far. In fact, they did not quite grasp each others’ real intentions or reach the right conclusions. It has been reported that in the talks, the North Koreans repeatedly said that the DPRK reserved the right to a peaceful satellite launch, and although the American side warned that any such action would be a deal-breaker, the North Koreans probably regarded these warnings as merely rhetoric, while the Americans believed their message had hit home.

DPRK Foreign Ministry: Kwangmyongsong-3 Ready to Launch

[CanKor received the following letter directly from the Pyongyang-based Korean Committee of Solidarity with the World's People. Images have been added from open Internet sources. We reproduce the letter in full without further comment. --CanKor]

Dear friends,

Warm greetings from Pyongyang!

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry released the following statement Friday on the entry of DPRK’s preparations for launching Kwangmyongsong-3 into a full-fledged stage of action:

The DPRK’s preparations for launching Kwangmyongsong-3, an earth observation satellite, by its own efforts and with its indigenous technology have entered a full-fledged stage of action.

The projected launch of the working satellite is a gift to be presented by the Korean people to the centenary of the birth of President Kim Il Sung while entering the gate to a thriving nation and a work for implementing the behest of leader Kim Jong Il.

It has become a law-governed requirement of the age of latest science and technology and a worldwide trend to launch and use a working satellite urgently needed for the country’s economic development.

“No Hostile Intent” Toward North Korea: US President Obama at Hankuk University

[The following are excerpts of a speech by US President Barack Obama to students of Hankuk University in Seoul, ROK. The text is from a release by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, dated "For Immediate Release March 26, 2012, 10:32 a.m. KST, Seoul, Republic of Korea". We have pulled out those sections of the speech related directly to the DPRK. --CanKor]

US President Barack Obama speaks to DPRK leaders during a speech at Hankuk University in Seoul on Monday. (Photo by Susan Walsh/AP)

(…)

Here in Korea, I want to speak directly to the leaders in Pyongyang. The United States has no hostile intent toward your country. We are committed to peace. And we are prepared to take steps to improve relations, which is why we have offered nutritional aid to North Korean mothers and children.

But by now it should be clear, your provocations and pursuit of nuclear weapons have not achieved the security you seek; they have undermined it. Instead of the dignity you desire, you’re more isolated. Instead of earning the respect of the world, you’ve been met with strong sanctions and condemnation. You can continue down the road you are on, but we know where that leads. It leads to more of the same — more broken dreams, more isolation, ever more distance between the people of North Korea and the dignity and the opportunity that they deserve.

And know this: There will be no rewards for provocations. Those days are over. To the leaders of Pyongyang I say, this is the choice before you. This is the decision that you must make. Today we say, Pyongyang, have the courage to pursue peace and give a better life to the people of North Korea. (Applause.)