Secret US-DPRK Talks? Chris Nelson Deciphers Recent White House Comments

[A number of statements by US Administration officials in recent weeks have some experts wondering whether there are secret US-DPRK talks happening through back channels and what might be the contents of such talks. In the 24 May 2012 edition of the Nelson Report, Chris Nelson ponders the significance of comments by Ben Rhodes, US deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, as reported by Yonhap news agency. We reprint the Yonhap story below, followed by Chris Nelson's commentary, with kind permission of the author. --CanKor]

WHAT’S UP WITH THE US AND DPRK? (by Chris Nelson)

That other major “war and peace” problem, N. Korea, also may be the subject of renewed discussions, at least… it seems very premature to talk about “negotiations”. We confirmed in Tuesday’s Report S. Korean and VOA accounts of a “secret” Administration mission to Pyongyang at the end of April, just prior to the failed ICBM/satellite launch.

(For current coverage in the ROK, see “U.S. Officials in Secret Visit to N. Korea Before Rocket Launch” in the English version of Chosun Ilbo.)

Yesterday, an official White House briefing, and then in Tokyo, State Dept. Special Envoy Glyn Davies, who was not on the mission, can be argued to have indirectly confirmed both the trip, and the purpose we had speculated in last night’s Report… that is, interest on both sides in trying to walk the situation back to the 2/29 agreement, including US food aid as a buy-in for resurrecting the agreement to freeze nuclear weapons and missile tests.

North Korea as a Nuclear Power and the Prospects of Its Control, by Hans-Joachim Schmidt

[This is a paper for German readers of CanKor. The author, Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, is Senior Research Fellow at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK) – also known in English as Peace Research Institute Frankfurt/M (PRIF) – and an expert on the Six-Party Talks. Dr. Schmidt is a good friend of CanKor and has previously submitted his work for our benefit. We thank the author for making the full German version of this paper available to CanKor. A brief summary of his latest paper follows here in both English and German. For the full version of the German paper, please follow this link: Nordkorea als Nuklearmacht - Chancen der Kontrolle, or by clicking on the image of the title page below. – CanKor]

North Korea as a Nuclear Power and the Prospects of Its Control

In the latest HSFK-Report, Hans-Joachim Schmidt evaluates the prospects of both cooperative and confrontational approaches against the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

Since its first nuclear test in 2006, a nuclear North Korea cannot be prevented anymore. Therefore, one major aim of international politics must be to delay, constrain and control the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

In HSFK-Report 1/2012, Nordkorea als Nuklearmacht – Chancen der Kontrolle (North Korea as a Nuclear Power and the Prospects of Its Control), Hans-Joachim Schmidt presents the multifaceted regional and global threats of both conventional and nuclear armament of North Korea and analyzes how the North Korean leadership can be urged to follow its international commitments.

He examines problems and prospects of cooperative and confrontational approaches by South Korea, the US, Japan, China and Russia who seek a political arrangement with North Korea regarding nuclear technology. Against the background of their different interests, the author develops specific propositions for a relaunch of the six-party talks following the presidential elections in the USA and South Korea.

North Korea’s Treacherous New Course, by Leon V. Sigal

[The following commentary by Leon Sigal, long-time friend of CanKor, appeared in the American bimonthly foreign-policy journal The National Interest, 19 April 2012. Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York and author of Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. --CanKor]

“There they go again.” That was the Washington’s reaction to North Korea’s recent rocket launch and renunciation of its February 29 commitment not to conduct a nuclear test. Yet this time looks different—and more dangerous. These actions suggest Pyongyang no longer cares about improving relations with the United States, the premise of its willingness to restrain its nuclear and missile efforts.

Unbounded nuclear and missile development by Pyongyang would gradually erode the security of all of its neighbors and the world at large. The only prudent course is a robust strategy of containment: denial of its weapons-related trade by tougher inspections of suspect cargo and tighter overflight restrictions.

A Mixed History

For years, North Korean officials have been saying they want to improve relations with the United States and were prepared to restrain their nuclear and missile programs in return. An end to enmity—what the North called U.S. “hostile policy”—would improve North Korean security and provide a counterweight to China. It would also facilitate aid and investment from South Korea and Japan, thereby reducing its economic dependence on China.

Given the lack of trust between the two countries, however, Pyongyang insisted on reciprocal steps by Washington—action for action—to build confidence. Pyongyang’s decision to conduct last week’s test launch, by contrast, destroyed confidence.

UN Security Council Identifies Additional Companies Subject to Sanctions

[On 16 April 2012, the United Nations Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement to condemn North Korea's failed missile launch. This directed the DPRK Sanctions Committee ("1718 Committee") to impose new sanctions and tighten enforcement of existing sanctions on the DPRK. On Monday, 2 May 2012, the Committee identified three new North Korean companies for sanctions, updated information on the Committee's lists of prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile technology, and clarified the Committee's annual work plan. The following is the text of Security Council document SC/10633. --CanKor]

Security Council Committee Determines Entities, Goods Subject to Measures Imposed on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by Resolution 1718 (2006)

On 16 April 2012, by its presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/13), the Security Council agreed to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009). The Security Council further directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to undertake these tasks and to report to the Security Council within 15 days.

On 2 May 2012, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) designated the following three entities to be subject to the provisions of and the measures imposed in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006):

1. AMROGGANG DEVELOPMENT BANKING CORPORATION

• Description: Amroggang, which was established in 2006, is a Tanchon Commercial Bank-related company managed by Tanchon officials. Tanchon plays a role in financing KOMID’s sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Tanchon Commercial Bank was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
• Location: Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, DPRK
• A.K.A.: AMROGGANGDEVELOPMENT BANK; AMNOKKANG DEVELOPMENT BANK

2. GREEN PINE ASSOCIATED CORPORATION

• Description: Green Pine Associated Corporation (“Green Pine”) has taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
  Green Pine is also responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK.
  Green Pine has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related material from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms.
• Location: c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea; Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK
• A.K.A.: CHO’NGSONG UNITED TRADING COMPANY; CHONGSONG YONHAP; CH’O'NGSONG YO’NHAP; CHOSUN CHAWO’N KAEBAL T’UJA HOESA; JINDALLAE; KU’MHAERYONG COMPANY LTD; NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION; SAEINGP’IL COMPANY

3. KOREA HEUNGJIN TRADING COMPANY

• Description: The Korea Heungjin Trading Company is used by KOMID for trading purposes. We suspect it has been involved in supplying missile-related goods to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Heungjin has been associated with KOMID, and, more specifically, KOMID’s procurement office. Heungjin has been used to procure an advanced digital controller with applications in missile design. KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
• Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
• A.K.A.: HUNJIN TRADING CO., KOREA HENJIN TRADING CO., KOREA HENGJIN TRADING COMPANY

The Committee also determined that the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic missile programmes in document S/2012/235 shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 8(a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).

Furthermore, the Committee determined that the items contained in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part1 shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 8(a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).

On the same date, the Committee also adopted its programme of work.

The lists of entities, goods and individuals are available on the Committee’s website, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml.

Related articles

• Statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council (CanKor.ca)

Statement by the (North) Korean Committee for Space Technology

[Following the unsuccessful launch of a DPRK satellite into orbit on Friday, 13 April 2012, and a UN Security Council President's statement on 16 April 2012 condemning the launch and pledging to add  “additional entities and items” to the existing sanctions, the DPRK Foreign Ministry pledged to launch more satellites, and declared that it would no longer be bound by the 29 February agreement with the USA. Numerous North Korean organizations have since made their own statements, in each case adding copious insults against outgoing ROK President Lee Myung Bak. Considering that this was the first time that the DPRK admitted that its satellite launch had failed, we found the following statement by the Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) particularly worthy of note. The statement is taken from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) website. --CanKor]

DPRK’s Satellites for Peaceful Purposes to Continue Orbiting Space: KCST Spokesman

Pyongyang, April 19 (KCNA) — A spokesman for the Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) Thursday released the following statement:

Unha-3 rocket at launch (photo source unknown)

Since the KCST’s announcement of the planned launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong-3 on March 16, the issue of the DPRK’s satellite launch has become topic of debate in the world. Those who sympathize with truth and love justice were unanimous in praising the plan with much expectation. But, the unjust and ill-tempered hostile forces have worked hard to mislead public opinion with groundless assertions and sophism.

The U.S. and Japanese reactionaries and their special class stooge Lee Myung Bak are taking the lead in the smear campaign. It is their brigandish assertion and their lackey’s nonsensical talk that the DPRK should not be allowed to launch a satellite for peaceful purposes. They claim that as Kwangmyongsong-3 was launched by Unha carrier rocket, it was not a satellite but a long-range missile and it, therefore, seriously threatened the U.S. mainland and Japanese archipelago and made south Korea unstable. Finally, they made a far-fetched assertion that the DPRK’s launch of the above-said satellite was “a violation” of the UNSC resolution and a grave “violation” of the DPRK-U.S. agreement and a military “provocation” to them.

Statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council

[The following is Statement number S/PRST/2012/13 taken from the UN Security Council website. Distr.: General, 16 April 2012, Original: English. -CanKor]

(photo by UN)

At the 6752nd meeting of the Security Council, held on Monday, 16 April 2012, in connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council strongly condemns the 13 April 2012 (local time) launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

“The Security Council underscores that this satellite launch, as well as any launch that uses ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite launch or space launch vehicle, is a serious violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

“The Security Council deplores that such a launch has caused grave security concerns in the region.

North Korea in April: Defining the Future Under Kim Jong Un by Ruediger Frank

[From time to time CanKor alerts readers to papers published by our partner-site 38North. The following article is authored by CanKor Brain Trust member Ruediger Frank. Find more articles by Ruediger Frank here. Please follow our link to the current article on the 38North site. --CanKor]

April 2012 promises to be an interesting month for North Korea and its observers, with at least four mega-events. The long announced celebrations to mark the 100th birthday of the country’s late founder Kim Il Sung will be held on the April 15. Two days before, the annual session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (the North Korean parliament) will convene. The fourth Conference of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) will take place on the 11th. Last, but not least, around the same time a rocket launch that has been criticized by the West as a missile test is set to take place.

April 15, 1912 was not only the day the Titanic sank. In a small village near Pyongyang, a boy with the name Kim Song Ju was born. Later, much like Lenin (Uljanow) and Stalin (Tschugaschwili), he adapted an alias. In October 1945, by then called Kim Il Sung, the 33 year old youngster was presented to the wondering population by the Soviets as the liberator of the country from the Japanese. Hardly anybody took the young man seriously back then, neither his Soviet protectors nor his much more numerous, senior, powerful and experienced domestic political competitors. They were wrong, as they later learned the hard way. By building and breaking alliances, first the Christians and then rival factions within the Korean Communist camp were eliminated or assimilated, until Kim Il Sung and his Kapsan guerilla faction had acquired a monopoly of power within the KWP.

Kim Il Sung smartly used the badly failed Korean War (1950-53) not only as a welcome occasion to eliminate some of his influential political foes. He also converted Korea into one of the hot spots of the Cold War and was thus able to force the Soviet Union and China to provide much more economic, military and political aid than either of them had originally intended. The costs for Mao Zedong included his eldest son Anying, still buried in North Korea. Even my home country East Germany, laying in ruins after World War II and the post-1945 demounting policy of the Soviets, and facing fierce competition from West Germany which prospered under the Marshall Plan, felt compelled to rebuild North Korea’s second largest city, Hamhung, at an enormous cost.

Canada “Unreservedly” Condemns Failed DPRK Rocket Launch

[The following is a statement by Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird as published on the Foreign Affairs and International Trade website. --CanKor]

Baird Strongly Condemns North Korea’s Rocket Launch

April 12, 2012 - Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today issued the following statement:

“Canada unreservedly condemns North Korea’s rocket launch of earlier today.

“This type of brazen behaviour is entirely reckless and provocative. It ignores not only international will but also the basic needs of the North Korean people.

“While the average North Korean starves and struggles, the country’s rulers squander scarce internal resources and external goodwill.

“Actions like today’s will only further isolate this rogue regime and keep North Koreans from the better, brighter existence they deserve but are being denied by those in power.

“Canada will continue to work with its international partners with a view to securing peace and prosperity on the entire Korean peninsula.”

Canada remains gravely concerned about North Korea’s aggressive activities, including missile tests and nuclear weapons development. Canada’s goal is to see North Korea resume adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and comply fully with its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In August 2011, Canada imposed extensive economic sanctions against North Korea, which will remain in place until North Korea makes significant progress toward denuclearization and its aggressive activities cease. These sanctions are in addition to the sanctions resulting from UN Security Council resolutions that explicitly prohibit North Korea from conducting launches using ballistic missile technology.

“Dual Disconnected Monologues”: NASA Expert James Oberg Visits DPRK Launch Site

[The following are two interviews with James Oberg, NBC "space consultant" and NASA Mission Control veteran. Both were conducted by Ed Flanagan, NBC News Producer, and published on World News on MSNBC.com. The first interview (Monday, 9 April 2012) carried the title NBC space expert on North Korea satellite launch: 'It's not a military missile ... but it's darn close', with the second (Wednesday, 11 April 2012) titled North Koreans desperate for Western approval of launch. --CanKor]

First Interview:

A close up view of North Korea’s Unha-3 rocket at the launch platform of the Tongchang-ri space center. (Photo by Pedro Ugarte, AFP - Getty Images)

When we learned that North Korea was planning on opening its tightly restricted Sohae Satellite Launching Center to foreign journalists for the first time, NBC News quickly decided we would need an expert eye to determine the accuracy and authenticity of Pyongyang’s claim that this latest rocket launch was for peaceful scientific purposes.

North Korea says it is planning to launch a weather observation satellite using a three-stage rocket during mid-April to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung. But the United States and South Korea say it is a test of a ballistic missile.

So NBC News invited James Oberg, our “Space Consultant,” to accompany us into North Korea to view the Kwanggmyongsong-1 satellite.

With a 22-year career as a space engineer in support of NASA’s spaceflight operations, Oberg has the experience and technical expertise to determine the veracity of North Korea’s claims about this mission.

NBC sat down with Oberg after visiting the Sohae Satellite Launch Center on Sunday to get his initial impressions of the facility, the mysterious satellite and the future of North Korea’s space program.

Q:  What are your first impressions from this visit to Sohae?

A: It was just amazing to be there, and the impression was that someone in the North Korean government made a very courageous decision to let us in.

The DPRK Rocket and Korean Peace by Georgy Toloraya

[From time to time CanKor alerts readers to papers published by our partner-site 38North. The following article is authored by Russian North Korea expert Georgy Toloraya. Please follow our link to the current article on the 38North site. --CanKor]

Why would North Korea sacrifice its long-cherished dream of improving relations with the United States for such a trivial thing as “fireworks” for a national holiday? Around the world, people are wracking their brains trying to explain this seemingly sudden “satellite launch” decision, and the theories that have emerged so far can be grouped as follows:

1. The DPRK had a calculated plan: first, reach an agreement that is attractive to the United States; then do something highly provocative to raise the stakes and create crisis; and finally, after the dust settles, negotiate from a position of strength to get more. In the process, North Korea also planned to confirm its status as a nuclear power and undermine the position of South Korean conservatives.[1]
2. The decision to launch a rocket is the result of a rift between “soft-liners” and “hard-liners” in Pyongyang, in the absence of strong leadership (as President Obama said, “we don’t know who’s calling the shots”). The North Korean negotiators did not know about the launch plan and did not discuss this issue with their American interlocutors when working out the “Leap Day” agreement.
3. There are even more exotic theories that imply it was a US plot to reach an agreement that demonstrated its desire for peace, while fully understanding that a satellite launch, about the right to which North Koreans have warned, would break the deal. As a result, there would be no need to fulfill controversial US obligations (like discussing the provision of an LWR and the lifting of sanctions), and they would gain new leverage to pressure an inexperienced North Korean leader to the brink of surrender. Paradoxically, the events unfolding so far fall well into such a scenario.

I believe, however, as often happens when real-world politics are analyzed by theoreticians, that the extent to which multistage planning was involved has been exaggerated, and that the influence of chaotic factors has been largely underestimated. In all likelihood, this is probably a case of diplomatic mishap, where both sides—both well intentioned to achieve meaningful results and promptly report them—due to internal policy considerations (the election campaign in United States and the official announcement of Kim Jong Un’s status on Kim Il Sung’s centenary birthday), pushed their luck too far. In fact, they did not quite grasp each others’ real intentions or reach the right conclusions. It has been reported that in the talks, the North Koreans repeatedly said that the DPRK reserved the right to a peaceful satellite launch, and although the American side warned that any such action would be a deal-breaker, the North Koreans probably regarded these warnings as merely rhetoric, while the Americans believed their message had hit home.