An Insider’s Account of Obama’s North Korea Strategy, by Jeffrey A. Bader

[On 8 March 2012 the Brookings Institution held a launch for Jeffrey Bader's latest book, “Obama and China's Rise: an Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy”. Bader is currently John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow in International Diplomacy, Foreign Policy at the John L. Thornton China Center in Washington DC. Previously, he was President Obama's Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council for the first 3 years. The following is a selection of what the author had to say about US North Korea policy, which figures prominently in the book. This selection is taken from the 9 Mach 2012 edition of The Nelson Report. To hear the entire speech, please click March 8, 2012 book launch at Brookings. --CanKor]

Jeffrey A. Bader

(…) Instead of describing how seamlessly we executed plans drawn up in the first days, let me lay out what we did in reaction to events. As one of my colleagues said to me after a frustrating day dealing with demands for elaboration of a strategy, “there’s no such thing as strategy; there’s only tactics.” An exaggeration, to be sure, sort of like the observation that history is just one damned thing after another. But it frequently feels like the complete truth when you’re in the middle of the fray.

First, North Korea, since that was the issue that posed the most immediate dangers and consumed so much time, effort, and energy.

We came into office on something like automatic pilot, prepared to pick up implementation of Assistant Secretary Chris Hill’s plan for dismantling the Yongbyon plutonium reactor. But North Korea quickly eliminated that option. Intelligence in February 2009 showed North Korean plans to launch an ICBM, later announced to be a satellite launch. We could not proceed with implementation of dismantlement, and further international shipments of heavy fuel oil, under the shadow of an ICBM launch. So it’s fair to say that North Korea’s plan produced a very significant hardening of attitudes in the Obama national security team.

38 North: Dealing with the Kims by Joel Wit & Jenny Town

[From time to time CanKor alerts readers to papers published by our partner-site 38North. The following article is authored by Joel Wit and Jenny Town. This article originally appeared on www.foreignpolicy.com, and has been reprinted with permission. The original can be found here. Please follow our link to this article on the 38North site. --CanKor]

This week’s meeting between U.S. Special Envoy Glyn Davies and North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan will be the first official encounter between the United States and North Korea since the death of Kim Jong Il two months ago. After endless speculation by the press and experts about the future of North Korea, this meeting will be an important reality check: an opportunity to take the pulse of the new management in Pyongyang, and particularly to discern changes or continuity in its efforts to build weapons of mass destruction.

Even on a good day, of course, we underestimate the difficulties of dealing with North Korea at our peril. Korea specialists are fond of calling it the “land of no good options” (although that is probably true for many foreign-policy challenges facing the United States today). The North remains the poster child for rogue states because of 60 years of bad behavior, including its more recent nuclear and missile tests in 2006 and 2009 and conventional military attacks on South Korea in 2010. If there is anyone who knows that, it’s those of us who have had direct experience dealing with North Koreans at the negotiating table, on the ground, or conducting any other business face-to-face with them.

Known Unknowns by Chris Nelson

[The following is taken from the 3 January 2012 edition of The Nelson Report, with kind permission by the author. --CanKor.]

The funeral parade is now over, and the official titles, as of this weekend, are all now awarded…and all to the Boy General, every single one, from the looks of it…and China has hastened to declare its fealty. (…)

So…is this really real? There’s no conceivable way to tell for the time being, and perhaps not for months, given the deliberate opacity of the ruling elite in Pyongyang, so we urge caution in reading any quotes from experts using flatly declarative verbs, adverbs and adjectives. (…)

With the above cautions in mind, here’s “known unknowns” we keep on our List:

• Will the new Leadership in Pyongyang continue the tentative outreach to the US which seemed to have advanced to the point of imminent announcement of a food for strategic concessions deal, a “first” in such overt linkage by the US…only to be put “on hold” by the sudden demise of Kim Jong-il?
• Similarly, will the new Leadership continue the positive back-channel contacts which were poised to produce a US announcement that special envoys Glyn Davies and Ford Hart would be dispatched to Beijing with an eye toward whether a new round of 6 Party Talks could be launched in the next few weeks or months?

ROK Government Planning to Resume Construction of Factories and Relax Sanctions for Kaesong Industrial Complex

Convenience store in Kaesong Industrial Park

[The following article is NK Brief No 11-10-20, taken from IFES Weekly News (10/26). The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) is a research arm of Kyungnam University in Seoul, founded during the height of the Cold War (1972) to promote peace and the unification of Korea. --CanKor]

According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification (MOU), the “May 24 Sanctions” that went into effect after the sinking of the naval boat Cheonan was relaxed and began to permit the resumption of construction of businesses in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). In addition, plans to build fire stations and emergency medical facilities in the area are also currently underway.

After South Korean Grand National Party chairman Hong Jun-pyo visited KIC on September 30, 2011, the ROK government has reached the following decisions: 1) to allow the resumption of halted factory constructions; 2) to build a fire station and emergency medical facility; 3) to resume repair work for commuting roads for KIC employees; and 4) to extend the operations of commuter buses.

This means seven companies that received permits in the past to begin construction but stopped after the sanctions went into effect would be able to resume the halted construction projects.

The Survival of North Korea by Suk Hi Kim

[From the Nautilus Policy Forum comes the following summary of a new book by Suk Hi Kim, Editor of North Korean Review. Entitled "The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics, and International Relations", the book interweaves threads of argument and evidence to reflect the complicated nature of the international conflict focused on and in Korea and the urgency of ending the standoff on the Peninsula to avoid what could easily escalate into a catastrophic, nuclear war. This summary provides an overview of the engagement options that the USA and its allies should consider as part of a long-term strategy to complement short-term efforts to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities. --CanKor.]

The Longevity of North Korea and Solutions to its Nuclear Standoff

In the late 2000s, North Korea faced its third wave of possible state collapse, a phenomenon largely rooted in Kim Jong-il’s poor health, an impending power transition to his son, Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s ongoing food shortages, and its failed currency and economic reforms. This latest speculation of North Korean collapse came from an array of intelligence analysts, Asian and American scholars, think tank specialists, and workers in relief organizations. [1] The first wave that predicted North Korea’s collapse occurred in the 1980s, when the North Korean economy spiraled downward as the country’s chief allies–the Soviet Union and China–discontinued new loans and demanded repayment of outstanding debts. [2] The second wave came in the mid-1990s, when the great North Korean famine claimed the lives of between 200,000 and 3,000,000 people. Since the end of the Cold War, most communist countries either collapsed or carried out significant economic reform except for North Korea. Why should we assume that North Korea, one of the survivors that did not implement economic reform, will continue to be an exception to the pattern of history and survive?

IISS Strategic Dossier: NORTH KOREAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) released a new dossier warning that DPRK provocations increase the risk of retaliation from South Korea. A press release issued by IISS summarizes the dossier as follows:

The latest IISS Strategic Dossier, North Korean Security Challenges: a net assessment, is the most systematic and thorough public analysis of the range of threats emanating from the state. This includes its two nuclear programmes, the world’s third largest chemical weapons arsenal, a range of ballistic missiles – all of which it appears willing to sell – plus the world’s fourth largest army. North Korea is the most militarized country on earth. North Korea is also threatening because of the criminality that seems hard-wired into the regime and the human security problems created by its repression and economic mismanagement.

The press release and a launch statement by its editor, Mark Fitzpatrick may be read by following these links:

IISS Press Release: North Korean provocations increase risk of retaliation

Launch statement by Mark Fitzpatrick, Editor, North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment

US Admiral Mullen on DPRK stability threat by Chris Nelson

[The following commentary is taken from the 14 July 2011 edition of the Nelson Report, with permission of the author. --CanKor.]

U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, left, speaks to incoming commander of combined U.S.-South Korea forces, U.S. Army Gen. James D. Thurman during a change-of-command ceremony for the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea at a U.S. military base in Seoul, South Korea, Thursday, 14 July 2011. (AP Photo/ Lee Jin-man)

Out there in the real world, at least the version known as Asia, Adm. Mullen wrapped up his very interesting four days in China with a visit to ally S. Korea, and jumped right into the domestic ROK debate over N. Korea…saying the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un succession process helped prompt last year’s DPRK sinking of the Cheonan.

Warming to a theme he’s been stressing to China since last December, Mullen spoke about “the whole provocation cycle” facing S. Korea, warning that the “threat remains very real” as the DPRK continues to improve its nuclear weapon capabilities, adding “I’m not convinced they won’t provoke again. I’ve said for a long time that the only thing predictable about N. Korea is their unpredictability”.

His conclusion: “We have a sense of urgency to essentially work on planning to deter the North from further provocations. Whether they will be deterred or not, that’s to be seen.”

So what’s Mullen up to here?

Security and Peace Settlement in North East Asia by Victor Hsu

[At a conference on Common Prosperity in the 21st Century, North East Asia held in Kwangju, South Korea on 7 July 2011, CanKor Brain Trust member Victor Hsu (Professor at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management in Seoul) made a number of points as a discussant. Some excerpts from his intervention are reprinted below. The full text can be accessed by clicking this link: Security and Peace Settlement in Northeast Asia. --CanKor]

The one dimension that should elicit more analysis in depth is the Inter-Korean conflict resulting from the post WWII division of the peninsula. Perhaps the speakers simply assumed that it is unnecessary given that we are meeting in Korea. Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize that our geopolitical analysis must not be limited to the DPRK’s nuclear program in the 6-Party Talks, important as it is. There are several equally urgent issues that require our collective attention.

• The peace and prosperity of North East Asia will remain elusive as long as Korea remains divided. Should there be any doubt let’s remind ourselves of the military tensions created by the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongypong Island.
• The division of Korea represents a dangerous tripwire for a major military conflagration. Political miscalculation, misperception of the other’s intentions, posturing or brinksmanship, however you call it, can easily ignite the peninsula with unimaginable consequences. The world’s top four armies may be pulled in, unleashing fire power hitherto unseen in any war theatre.

U.S. and North Korea: The land of lousy options by John Kerry

[John Kerry, a US senator from Massachusetts, heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In an Op Ed published in the Los Angeles Times on 26 June 2011, Kerry states that Washington's approach to North Korea's bad behaviour has been measured, firm, but inadequate. He calls for the USA to re-engage directly with the DPRK, beginning with the provision of food aid. - CanKor.]

Senator John Kerry

Sixty-one years ago this weekend, North Korean artillery opened fire along the 38th Parallel, and a war began that claimed the lives of more than 33,000 American soldiers, 100,000 Chinese “volunteers” and 2 million Koreans.

Today, the goal of building a lasting peace remains elusive. In fact, the peninsula is more dangerous than ever. North Korea has twice tested nuclear weapons and is developing missiles to carry them. It has built facilities capable of producing highly enriched uranium for more nuclear weapons. In defiance of a U.N. arms embargo, it continues to export weapons and sensitive technologies to unsavory partners such as Myanmar. And last year, the deadliest since the armistice in 1953, a North Korean torpedo killed 46 South Korean sailors and an artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island killed four more South Koreans.

The U.S. response to all of this has been measured but firm. It has also been inadequate.

Canadian FM responds to UCC letter

Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon

Last November, when Canada announced it was instituting a policy of “controlled engagement” with the DPRK as well as new economic sanctions, the United Church of Canada (UCC), jointly with the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) and the Presbyterian Church in Korea (PCRK) wrote a letter to Prime Minister Harper stating their concerns.

The UCC received a response from Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon which can be found here:

2011 02 11 Lawrence Cannon letter to UCC.

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